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 ABSTRACT 
  
A new mechanism that substantially mitigates social dilemmas is examined theoretically 
and experimentally. It resembles the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) except that 
in each decision round subjects are ranked and then grouped according to their public 
contribution. The game, particularly in a discrete implementation, has multiple mostly 
asymmetric, Pareto-ranked pure-strategy equilibria which are rather counterintuitive, yet 
experimental subjects tacitly coordinate the payoff-dominant equilibrium reliably and quite 
precisely. In the VCM grouping is random which, with its arbitrary relation to contribution 
corresponds to any grouping unrelated to output, for example grouping based on race or 
gender. The new mechanism resembles a meritocracy since based on how much they 
contribute participants are assigned to strata that vary in payoff. The findings shed light on 
the nature of merit-based social and organizational grouping and provide guidelines for 
future research and application.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sorting and grouping of similar types are ubiquitous in human communities. As 
pointed out by Schelling (1971), an important factor that determines the exact nature of 
social segregation is the grouping and stratification criteria that social units such as 
organizations and societies actually apply. Throughout history, stratification has most often 
been based on arbitrary criteria such as gender, race, class, heritage, nepotism or cronyism, 
which are unfair and quite inefficient since they usually fail to place the best suited agent 
into a given position, and are unrelated to a person’s output.   
Modern organizations and contemporary societies increasingly reject such arbitrary 
criteria and are becoming meritocracies, where grouping and stratification is competitively 
based on individual contributions. This development has been helped along in the past 
century or so by equal-rights movements, scholarship programs, and increasingly global, 
and hence more intense, competition in education and business. Talent searches for 
outstanding workers or graduate students are becoming more geographically balanced, and 
performance reviews in organizations more extensive and systematic. Labor markets, the 
hiring and promotion systems of organizations, education systems1, and even immigration 
policies2 increasingly take on the features of a meritocracy. With the resulting increase in 
competitiveness of these social units, units that still apply sorting and segregation systems 
that are unrelated to output and make them less productive and competitive3 can be 
expected to weaken, and either change or disappear. 4  
                                                 
 1 For example, in order to increase their intellectual competitiveness the impact of legacy preferences in Ivy 
League schools was decreased; other non-performance related intake criteria common in the early 20th 
century in order to control the ethnic and gender composition of the student body were abolished (Karabel, 
2005).  
2 For example, Australia offers preferential entry for skilled immigrants. 
3 An early example is 13th century Mongol general Genghis Khan, who founded the first Mongol empire, and 
conquered large regions of Asia. He broke with tradition by placing warriors in his military hierarchy based 
on loyalty and ability only, regardless of their origin.  
4 For example Singapore, among the most successful Asian countries by most standards, seceded from 
Malaysia in 1965 because it rejected ethnic quotas in the assignment of social and professional roles in favor 
of meritocratic principles.  
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Our results show that in addition to placing the most able person into a given 
position, and being often perceived as fairer than other stratification systems, meritocracies 
have yet another advantage over arbitrary stratification: arbitrary stratification generates an 
incentive for everyone to free-ride since an individual’s contribution has in the extreme 
case, no impact at all on his strata membership. Examples would be caste systems, or the 
pre-revolutionary social structure of France. A meritocracy on the other hand, as our 
theoretical analysis (Section II) and experiments (Sections IV and V) show, can be an 
effective mechanism to substantially reduce free-riding in an organization or society.  The 
theoretical analysis also sheds some light on existing experimental results (reviewed in 
Section III) about the effectiveness of competitive sorting as a means of attenuating social 
dilemmas.  
 
II. THEORY 
We model a meritocracy as a variation of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
(VCM) (Isaac, McCue & Plott, 1985), which has become a standard model to explore free-
riding.  N Participants are randomly assigned to groups of fixed size n. Group members 
then each decide simultaneously and anonymously how much of their individual funds w to 
keep for themselves, and how much to contribute to their group account. Contributions to 
the group account are multiplied by a factor g representing the benefits from cooperation 
before being equally divided among all n group members. In the remainder of this paper, 
we denote the rate g/n by m. It is the marginal per capita return (henceforth, MPCR) to 
each group member from an investment in the group account. As long as (1<g<n) 5   the 
game is a social dilemma since efficiency is maximized if all participants contribute fully, 
but each individual’s dominant strategy is to keep her endowment while receiving her share 
                                                 
5 We assume without loss of generality that the multiplication factor for the private account is simply 1.  
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of the group account. The VCM’s widely replicated result is that the equilibrium of 
noncontribution by all is all but reached after about ten repetitions (see, e.g., Ledyard, 
1995; Davis and Holt, 1993).  
The key difference between the VCM and the Meritocracy Mechanism introduced 
here (henceforth, MM) is that in a standard VCM participants are assigned to groups at 
random. In its effects on incentives this is comparable to grouping by criteria unrelated to 
individuals’ contribution, such as race or gender. In the MM in contrast, group membership 
is based on individuals’ contributions to the group account. At each round, all MM 
participants get ranked according to their contribution decision. Only thereafter and based 
on this ranking are participants partitioned into equal-sized groups. For the equilibrium 
analysis of the MM game (see below) it is important to note that any ties for group 
membership are broken at random. In the decision round’s final step, individual earnings 
are computed taking into account to which group a subject has been assigned. All this is 
common knowledge.  
Since the MM is not just about a single group but about a mini-society consisting of 
several units, it differs from the VCM in how members of a cooperative group are modeled 
within their larger society: In the standard VCM each arbitrarily composed group is 
modeled in isolation. In the MM all socially mobile members of a community are linked 
via a cooperative-competitive mechanism in which they, with their contribution decisions, 
compete for membership in strata with potentially different collective output and payoffs. 
The MM’s equilibrium analysis (see Section II.A for its formal treatment) must therefore 
cover multiple groups, which increases the model’s realism. Under naturally occurring 
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circumstances too, cooperative groups do not exist in isolation but are part of a larger social 
fabric.6  
The MM has a close to Pareto-optimal equilibrium: In contrast to the VCM with its 
dominant strategy equilibrium of non-contribution by all, the MM has multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria. Non-contribution by all remains one of them, underscoring that the game 
retains some social dilemma properties, but with the introduction of competitive group 
assignment these can be overcome since there is now an additional, asymmetric pure 
strategy equilibrium that is close to Pareto optimal. In this equilibrium most (i.e., more than 
N-n) participants contribute their entire endowment, and only the remainder contribute 
nothing7. To illustrate, Tables 1A and 1B shows the equilibria for the version of the MM 
game experimentally tested in Sections IV and V of this paper, where N=12, n=4, the 
individual endowment w is 100 tokens, and the MPCR m is either 0.3 or 0.5. The close-to-
Pareto-optimal equilibrium configuration is shown in Row 16 (for MPCR=0.3) and 20 (for 
MPCR=0.5). The Table lists, in addition to this quite efficient equilibrium and the 
aforementioned equilibrium of non-contribution by all (Rows 1 and 17, respectively), 
further equilibria with very low group contributions.  Such additional, low-efficiency 
equilibria emerge in the stylized environment of an experiment, where the strategy space 
needs to be discretized for purposes of experimental implementation. Their exact number 
and structure are MPCR dependent. They are of limited practical importance since A) they 
arise only due to unavoidable stylizing of the game for an experimental setting, and most 
importantly, B) the payoff-dominant equilibrium, which holds in both continuous and 
discrete cases (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988) is without doubt the coordinating principle of the 
                                                 
6 The assumption of fixed group size (just as in the VCM) might at first appear quite stylized for a model 
designed to represent social stratification. However, social stratification often implies fixed group (stratum) 
size. Examples are journal space in tier 1 journals or labor markets in which there are usually a fixed number 
of jobs available, such as the annual supply of junior positions at Research 1 universities. In such cases, if 
there are more “perfect” candidates than positions, a perfect candidate will reach the top stratum only with 
probability <1. 
7 As long as the boundary conditions of the Theorem in Section II.A are satisfied.  
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game in empirical tests (see Section V).  8We now proceed to a formal treatment of the 
continuous version of the MM, which is easier to analyze and possibly more realistic since 
real-word MM contributions are rarely monetary,9 before once again turning to the 
equilibrium configurations of the MM’s experimental test later in the paper, where the 
strategy space is by necessity discrete.  
 
II.A. Formal equilibrium analysis 
Define the meritocracy mechanism (MM) as a game with N players. As in the 
VCM, each player i = 1, …, N has an endowment w > 0, makes a contribution si ∈ [0; w] to 
a group account, and keeps the remainder (w – si) in her private account. After their 
investment decisions, all players are ranked according to their group account contributions 
with ties broken at random, and divided in G groups of equal size n (G = N/n). The n 
subjects with the highest contributions are put into group 1; the following n subjects with 
the next highest contributions are put into group 2, and so on. Without loss of generality, 
let s1 ≥ s2 ≥ … ≥ sN, i. e. group 1 consists of players 1 to n, group 2 of players (n+1) to 2n 
and so on. After subjects have been grouped, their payoffs are computed. Each player’s 
payoff πi consists of the amount kept in her private account, plus the total group 
contribution of all the players in her group multiplied by the MPCR m ∈ (1/n; 1):  
 
 
Observation 1: Obviously, the strategy profile s1 = s2 = … = sN = 0 is an equilibrium: 
since m < 1, no player can profit from contributing a strictly positive amount to the group 
account if all others give zero. 
                                                 
∑ +−
+−=
+−=
nnii
niij
jiii smsw
)mod(
1)mod(
π
8 Interestingly, in all equilibria involving contributions including the payoff dominant one, the expected 
payoffs from the different strategies are quite similar even though the ex-post payoffs, and the average 
payoffs per group, vary significantly. 
9 And even in the monetary case, micropayments are becoming increasingly common.  
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Consider now the case in which some players make strictly positive contributions. 
Let l = maxi {si | i = 1, … N} denote the highest contribution, L the set of players 
contributing l (i.e. si = l ∀ i ∈ L), and b = |L| the number of players contributing l. Clearly, 
b < N, else each player would profit from unilaterally changing her contribution from l to 
zero.  
Observation 2: When some strategies are positive (b mod n) > 0, i.e. in equilibrium a high 
contributor i ∈ L is grouped with positive probability with some other player(s) 
contributing less than she does. If b mod n were zero, player i, who at present contributes l, 
could reduce her contribution by a small ε  and still remain grouped exclusively with high 
contributors. For the same reason b must be larger than n. 
Lemma 1:  When some strategies are positive, the highest contribution l cannot be smaller 
than w. 
Proof: Since a high-contributor i ∈ L is grouped, with positive probability, with at least 
one player who contributes less than l, her expected payoff Eπi  is smaller than w – l + m n 
l. Assume l were smaller than w and let Δ = w – l + m n l – Eπi (Δ > 0). Let player i increase 
her contribution from l to l' := min {l + Δ / (2 (1-m)); w}. Then, player i will be grouped 
with only high contributors with certainty and her payoff is 10
.
2/
2222
')1('
Δ−+−>
Δ−+−=
−
Δ++−+−
Δ−−≥
+−+−
mnllw
mnllw
m
mmlmlmnl
m
lw
mllnmlw
 
Thus, contributing l' makes player i better off. Consequently, in equilibrium the highest 
positive contributions cannot be smaller than w. 
                                                 
10 The weak inequality “≥” in the second line holds strictly (“>”) if l' = w. If l’ = l + Δ / (2 (1-m)) it holds with 
equality (“=”). 
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Lemma 2: When some strategies are positive and the highest contribution to the group 
account is w, there cannot be another player j with a contribution 0 < sj < w.  
Proof: Let b > n players contribute w and define z := (b mod n). Consider player j who 
contributes the maximum among all players i ∉ L. Assume first that there were no ties with 
respect to the group membership of player j. Then player j could contribute slightly less 
and remain in that same group with certainty. This cannot be an equilibrium. If, on the 
other hand, we allow for player j being tied for group membership, then with probability p 
she will be in a group in which the highest contribution is sj. Only with probability (1-p), 
she will be in a group in which (n-z) payers contribute sj and z players contribute w. Player 
j’s expected payoff is therefore: 
( )
( ) .)(
)()1(
jjj
jjjj
swpmzmzwsznmsw
zwsznmpmnspswE
−−+−+−=
π ++−≤ − − +
 
If player j increased her contribution to l’ = min{sj+1/2 pmz (w-sj)/(1-m); w}, she would be 
in a group with a higher total contribution with certainty. Her alternative payoff πj' can be 
estimated with respect to a lower bound by11
( )
( ) .)()(
2
1
)()1(
12
1
12
1)(
12
1'
zwsznmswpmzsw
zwsznmm
m
sw
pmzsw
zw
m
sw
pmzsznm
m
sw
pmzsw
jjj
j
j
j
j
j
j
jj
+−+−−−=
+−+−−
−−−=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
−+−+−
−−−≥π
 
The difference πj' – Eπj is:  
.0)(
2
1' >−≥− jj swpmzEπ  jπ
                                                
Thus, player j would profit from unilaterally deviating by increasing her contribution.  
Lemma 3: In any equilibrium with positive contributions, the number N – b of players 
contributing zero is smaller than n.  
 
11 Again, the weak inequality “≥” holds strictly (“>”) if l’ = w. 
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Proof: It was shown above that in equilibrium (b mod n) > 0. Consequently ((N – b) mod 
n) > 0 as well. If (N – b) were larger than n, then any zero contributor could increase her 
payoff by contributing some small ε and become with certainty a member of the mixed 
group, in which some members contribute their entire endowment w. In this case her 
expected payoff is clearly higher than if she were grouped with these same players only 
with some probability p < 1. 
 
The following observation summarizes the above findings. 
Observation 3: In equilibrium each player contributes either zero or the entire endowment 
w. Moreover, the number b of players who contribute the entire endowment is either zero 
or larger than N-n. 
 
Based on Observation 3, the following Theorem specifies all equilibria of the MM. 
 
Theorem: If m < 
1
1
2 +−
−
nNn
nN +  the only equilibrium of the MM is that all players contribute 
nothing. If m is of the form 
zznnN
znN
++−−
+m −=
)1)((
for z ∈ {2, 3, …, n-1}, then there 
exist additionally, almost efficient equilibria in which b = N-n+z-1 or b = N-n+z players 
contribute w and the remaining n-z+1 or, respectively,  n-z players contribute zero. If 
1
1
2 +−
+−
nNn
nN
                                        
 < m < 112, but m is not of the above form, then there exists exactly one b ∈ 
{N-n+1, N-n+2, …, N-1} such that b players contributing w and the remaining N-b players 
         
12 As N becomes large this condition converges to the Pareto optimality condition or  
nnNn
nN 1
1
1
2 →− +− +  as 
. N ∞→
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contributing zero is an equilibrium. Besides these almost efficient equilibria and an 
equilibrium of non-contribution by all, there are no further equilibria. 
Proof: According to Lemma 3, in all equilibria with positive contributions, the number b 
of players who contribute their endowment w is larger than  N-n. As above, z = (b mod n). 
Thus, for all equilibrium candidates with positive contributions z ∈ {1, 2, …, n-1}. 
Consider a full contributor. Her expected payoff is 
. 
22
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−+=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−++− znN
nNnzmwn
znN
nNz
znN
zmw
( )1
It never pays for this player to lower her contribution by ε since she would then be grouped 
with certainty with at least some zero-contributors. If the same player changes her 
contribution to zero, her payoff is −+ zmww . Thus, in equilibrium       
( )
( )11
1
22
22
−+≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−+⇔
−+≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−+
zm
znN
nNnzm
zmww
znN
nNnzmw
                                                
 (1) 
must hold, which is independent of the initial endowment w. With respect to z, the left hand 
side of (1) grows more slowly than the right hand side.13 This means that if the inequality 
is violated for z = 1, in which case a full contributor has an incentive to change her 
contribution to zero (i.e. there is no equilibrium with z = 1), then there is also no 
equilibrium in which z > 1. Thus, we will start examining the equilibrium candidates where 
z = 1, and will then proceed to the candidates where z = 2, … (n-1). 
For z = 1, one obtains from (1) the following necessary equilibrium condition, which 
provides a lower bound for an MPCR that allows for equilibria with full contributors: 
 
13 The right hand side grows with a rate of m. The left hand side can be rewritten as 
znN
nNnzm +−
−+ )(2
which grows more slowly than mz
N n z
nNzzm =+−
−+ )(2
, which again grows at a rate of 
m. 
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.
1
1
1 2 +−≥⇔≥⎟⎟⎠+− nNn
m
nN
112 +−⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +− nNnNnm
mw
 (2) 
Now, consider the situation of a zero contributor. Her payoff is given by 
w+ z  
If the zero-contributor deviates to contributing w, her expected payoff changes to 
( )
( ) .
1
1
++−
−++
znN
nNnzmw
1
1
1
1
22
=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++−
−++++−
+ n
znN
nNz
znN
zmw
( )
 
This gives the second necessary equilibrium condition: 
( )
1++−
1
1
1
1
22
22
−++≥+⇔
++−
−++≥+
znN
nNnz
mmz
znN
nNnz
mwmwzw
 (3) 
which implicitly sets an upper bound for m. For the special case of z = 1, this upper bound 
is 
2
2
2
21
2
22
−+−−
+−≤⇔
+−
−+≥+
nNnNn
nNm
nN
nNnmm
 (4) 
which is the lower bound of m for an equilibrium with z = 2. 
Three observations are crucial: First, the upper bound (4) is larger than the lower bound (2) 
for the MPCR m and consequently there is a nondegenerate interval of MPCRs for which 
equilibria exist in which z = 1. Moreover, for MPCR values within this interval the only 
two pure strategy equilibria are s1 = s2 = … = sN = 0 and s1 = s2 = … = sb = w, sb+1= … = sN 
= 0 (b = N – n + z).  Second, if m increases above the upper bound (4), there is no longer an 
equilibrium with z = 1. However, a violation of inequality (4) (or (3), respectively) exactly 
yields the necessary condition for an equilibrium with z = 2 (or z' = z+1 in the general case) 
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from the perspective of a full contributor. Thus, if (2) is fulfilled, but one/some of the upper 
bounds of the MPCR for a given z is violated, then there exists an equilibrium with a larger 
z. Third, if the upper bound (3) yields with equality, then there exist equilibria with both z 
and z+1. This concludes the proof.  
Discrete strategy space: If the strategy space is discrete rather than continuous the 
above equilibrium analysis holds, but additional pure strategy equilibria can emerge. The 
reason for this is quite intuitive. Changing one’s contribution by a very small amount is 
close to costless; changing it by, say, one unit token as in an experiment (see Sections IV 
and V) is not. Hence, if the strategy space is discrete rather than continuous, additional 
stable configurations may exist where it does not behoove a participant to unilaterally 
change his contribution by an entire unit token even though it would pay off to change it by 
a small ε. In our experimental test of the MM (Section IV), such additional stable 
configurations logically emerge when group account contributions by other participants are 
low or the MPCR is low. Table 1, which lists all pure strategy equilibria possible under the 
two MPCR conditions tested experimentally (with an integer strategy space of si ∈ {0, 1, 2, 
…, 100}tokens) illustrates this point.  The equilibria that hold in both the continuous and 
the discrete case are highlighted in the table. The additional equilibria listed (Rows 2-15, 
and 18, 19) are of little practical importance since they are clearly payoff inferior and most 
importantly, do not account for actual behavior. 14  The payoff dominant equilibrium 
(Harsanyi & Selten, 1988) described in the Theorem above is clearly the behavioral 
organizing principle (see Section V), a fact that makes the MM a simple and effective 
mechanism to foster cooperation.  Another reason for the MM’s practical significance as 
illustrated in its existing applications in the field is the fact that the group good in the MM 
covers a relatively broad spectrum of goods.  
                                                 
14 See http://anna.rvik.com/M/dis.pdf for the formal analysis of all equilibria in the discrete case.  
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II.B. The excludability of the group good in the MM 
Extending the concept of excludability  
By adding competitive sorting based on contributions to an otherwise standard 
VCM we also explore a more general conjecture about the effects of excludability on the 
ease of providing public goods. It is generally accepted that excludable group goods are 
more easily provided than nonexcludable ones, and that goods can be placed on a spectrum 
according to their excludability (Buchanan, 1965).  However, there is an additional and 
often overlooked point to consider: what exactly are the criteria for exclusion? Are they 
under individual control, such as effort or are they entirely arbitrary?  
We suggest expanding Buchanan’s spectrum with a second axis representing to 
what extent the exclusion criteria are under individual control. The latter obviously is most 
important for efficiency since it determines to what extent individuals can be incentivized 
to work for the public good. Obviously, random assignment in the VCM is meant to model 
non-excludability - all participants have an equal chance of being in any group. However, 
with regard to its arbitrariness, disconnectedness from output, and lack of individual 
control, a lottery for group membership in an experiment is equivalent to the genetic lottery 
of gender or skin color which determines life-long strata assignment in non-meritocratic 
societies.  
In Section II.A we found that with contribution-based rather than arbitrary 
excludability A) inefficient equilibria still exist, B) there is still no100% efficient 
equilibrium, and C) as long as the conditions in the Theorem are met, there always exists 
an equilibrium in which the resource allocation is close to Pareto optimal.  
The location of the MM team output along Buchanan’s spectrum  
Various mechanisms have been proposed in the past for the provision of public 
goods. See Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), Smith (1977), Walker (1981), 
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and Varian (1994) for some of the most notable. Manageable versions of some of these 
mechanisms have been tested in the laboratory, but with mixed results (see, e.g. Scherr & 
Babb, 1975; Smith, 1977; Chen & Tang, 1998; Andreoni & Varian, 1999; Attiyeh, 
Franciosi & Isaac, 2000; Chen & Gazzale, 2005; Oprea, Smith & Winn, 2005) and these 
mechanisms have usually not been used in the field.15 The MM in contrast has evolved in 
the field and, as discussed in Section I, has been implemented in diverse contemporary and 
even historical settings. 
It matters for the practical applicability of the MM model that the team output in 
both the VCM and the MM need not be a pure public good in Samuelson’s (1954) sense. 
Rather, the VCM’s and the MM’s group account covers a range near the public end of 
Buchanan’s (1965) spectrum, not just an endpoint. This is because group size is fixed and 
every group member gets the same share of the group account. Debate about the extent to 
which the group account is congestible, excludable, or rival is therefore unnecessary.16 
Further, the linear and commonly known monetary payoff functions of the VCM and MM 
allow bypassing the issue of preference revelation that is central to traditional public goods 
mechanisms. The VCM’s and MM’s focus is thus shifted away from determining the 
optimal allocation and provision level and toward the act of free-riding itself. The group 
account in the VCM or MM can represent any joint output by a team, organization or 
society, ranging from a pure public good to a shared good that is divisible and/or rival, 
such as for example a pooled investment.  
Since it covers a broad range of team production goods, the MM model is 
applicable as a social or organizational structure that increases efficiency or effectiveness 
                                                 
15 To our knowledge the sole exception is a market-like mechanism used in a public good context, reported in 
Ferejohn and Noll (1976). 
16Were group size variable (non-excludability), experimentally (hence, monetarily) modeling nonrival 
consumption of the joint output poses a challenge since the MPCR varies with group size unless g is also 
concomitantly varied;  the latter however affects the attractiveness of the social optimum. 
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in a variety of contexts. We next show that its equilibria involving positive contributions 
may be affected by risk attitudes, but are quite robust to errors by single players.  
 
 II. C. The stability of the relatively efficient equilibria in the MM   
MPCR-dependent risk and strategic uncertainty  
It is well known that in a standard VCM the MPCR affects behavior even though, 
within the limits set by the social dilemma property of the game, it does not affect the 
equilibrium: The lower the MPCR, the faster the convergence toward non-contribution by 
all (see, e.g., Gunnthorsdottir, Houser & McCabe, 2007; Isaac & Walker, 1988; Isaac, 
Walker & Thomas, 1984). There are two possible reasons for this: First, the lower the 
MPCR the less of a difference there is between the efficient payoff when everybody 
contributes and the equilibrium payoff when nobody contributes. Second, the maximum a 
full contributor can lose is (1-m) w while non-contribution guarantees a payoff of at least w. 
There is ample evidence, starting with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal paper, that 
people are sensitive to the risk of losses in relation to their original wealth level w. All 
these facts taken together mean that contributing, never an equilibrium strategy in the 
VCM, is even less attractive there the lower the MPCR. All these facts hold for the MM as 
well, but with additional twists.  
Compared to the VCM, the MM involves additional strategic uncertainty. First, 
there is now always a choice between equilibria. Second, in any equilibrium involving 
group contributions, a contributor’s final payoff depends on the random process that solves 
the ties for group membership. Finally, as shown in Table 1, the payoff from contributing 
is usually slightly lower than the payoff from free-riding, be the latter expected, or even 
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guaranteed (The latter is the case if less than N-n participants free-ride).17 The higher the 
positive contributions in a strategy profile are, the greater is this difference.  In an 
experimental test of the MM, if subjects are sensitive to how efficient payoffs differ by 
MPCR, or are averse to loss relative to their original endowment level w (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), or are responsive to how free-rider payoffs compare to cooperator payoffs 
in equilibrium, they might be more reluctant to contribute fully under MPCR=0.3.   
Robustness to small deviations by individual players  
While the relatively efficient equilibrium configurations in Table 1 may be 
susceptible to risk attitudes, they are quite robust to deviations by single players. If a 
contributor reduces his contribution he is placed in a lower group with increased 
probability if not with certainty. This reduces his payoff, but the incentives of other 
contributors are well protected from such an individual downward deviation. The 
remaining contributors’ likelihood of getting into a high group, and hence their payoff, 
would actually increase! They have therefore no reason to drastically drop their 
contributions in such a case. In this regard the MM differs significantly from weakest-link 
games or step-level public goods mechanisms, (discussed in the next section), where a 
deviation downward by a single player can be quite disastrous to overall efficiency, since it 
leads to others’ investments being wasted, which in turn drives everyone’s incentives 
toward a much less efficient equilibrium with lower (or even zero) team contributions.  
 
III. RELATED GAMES AND EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
Refined by the payoff dominance criterion (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988) the MM leads 
to unique predictions about aggregate behavior. The payoff dominance principle however 
is not the sole method of equilibrium selection and not entirely uncontested (see, e.g., 
                                                 
17 The sole exception is the middle strategy in the three-strategy asymmetric equilibrium in Row 10 of Table 
1A, where the expected payoff from contributing 2 tokens exceeds by 0.02 tokens the certain payoff from 
contributing nothing.  
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Binmore, 1989; Aumann, 1988). It is therefore desirable to triangulate with an empirical 
test of equilibrium selection for specific games.  Does the MM’s contribution-based group 
assignment indeed induce participants to coordinate the most efficient among its equilibria, 
asymmetric and counterintuitive as it is?  We now proceed to briefly review the 
experimental literature on competitive group membership, and the tacit coordination of 
payoff dominant and asymmetric equilibria that would lead one to hypothesize such an 
outcome. 
Exclusion and Competitive group membership 
Recent empirical studies with the standard VCM as their benchmark show 
impressive efficiency gains if it is common information that group membership is 
competitively based on contributions. Cabrera, Fatas, Lacomba & Neugebauer’s (2006) 
two-group experiment indicates that even very limited contribution-based mobility raises 
average contributions.18 In an experiment by Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman’s (2005) 
there was greater mobility; subjects were informed about each others’ historical 
contributions19 and could permanently expel others, via a majority vote. Most relevant to 
the MM are the results of Page, Putterman & Unel (2006). Players were again informed 
about each others’ historical contributions and ranked each other on their desirability as 
fellow group members. The ranking determined the composition of fixed-size groups. As 
in all these studies, there were substantial efficiency gains. Interestingly, endogenous 
decentralized ranking by the participants themselves accurately traced individuals’ 
historical contribution. In real-world meritocratic systems ranking is frequently 
                                                 
18Croson, Fatas & Neugebauer (2006) apply a different form of limited exclusion. The lowest contributor is 
excluded from the group output in that round, rather than from the group, which maintains its composition 
over rounds. Hence, there is no contribution-based re-stratification. It is noteworthy that competition within a 
team for access to the group output, rather than competition across a mini-society as in the MM, also raises 
contributions to near-optimal levels. 
19 The inclusion of historical contributions in ranking systems, such as in Cinyabuguma et al. and Page et al. 
is a realistic assumption, as seen in the reliance on vitas, references, and other reputational mechanisms.  
However, it would significantly complicate any attempt an equilibrium analysis.  
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decentralized and endogenous as in Page et al.’s study. We note however that centralized 
ranking, as in the MM, is also common.20  
Tacit Coordination 
The MM requires two forms of tacit coordination: First, participants must 
coordinate one among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Second, since most pure strategy 
equilibria including the most efficient one are asymmetric (Table 1), subjects must 
coordinate the equilibrium strategies in the correct proportions.  Each of these coordination 
challenges has been studied extensively on their own, in particular in market entry games 
(asymmetric equilibria), and weakest link games (multiple Pareto ranked equilibria), games 
substantially differ from the MM. They co-occur in step-level VCMs. We now briefly 
review each in turn. 
Tacit coordination of asymmetric equilibria.  In the most typical version of the market 
entry (ME) game (Selten & Guth, 1982; Gary-Bobo, 1990) each player decides whether or 
not to engage in an activity, such as entering a market.  For not entering, the payoff is a 
low, positive constant; for entering, the payoff is potentially higher but decreases in the 
number of entrants. In the (Pareto deficient) equilibrium payoffs from entering or staying 
out are - somewhat depending on the granularity of the parameters - roughly equal.   
Relatively large groups of experimental subjects coordinate these asymmetric equilibria 
“without learning and communication” (Camerer & Fehr, 2006, p.50). See, e.g., Meyer, 
Van Huyck, Battalio & Saving 1992; Rapoport, 1995; Rapoport, Seale, Erev & Sundali, 
1998; Sundali, Rapoport and Seale, 1995; Erev & Rapoport, 1998. Even though the 
equilibrium organizes aggregate behavior surprisingly well, individual level data are quite 
unsystematic, supporting neither pure nor mixed strategies  (Rapoport, Seale & Winter, 
                                                 
20 With regard to promotion or skilled immigration, for example, ranking is by a central agent. On the other 
hand, endogenous stratification exists in labor markets, or in self-selected teams such as among co-authors.  
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2002; Seale & Rapoport, 2000; Erev & Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport, 1995; see also Duffy & 
Hopkins, 2005). 
Multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. In a series of “weakest link” (henceforth, WL) 
games much replicated since, Van Huyck and colleagues let symmetric subjects 
simultaneously choose an integer. The higher the integer the higher the cost to the 
individual, and the higher the associated potential payoff. However, everyone’s payoff is 
determined by the lowest integer chosen within the group. Hence, any contribution above 
this “weak link” is wasted. Any symmetric choice pattern is an equilibrium; the most 
efficient is where everyone chooses the highest possible number. Overall, there is mixed 
support in these games for the claim that a payoff dominant equilibrium is always focal  
(see, e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990, 1991; see also Ochs, 1995 for an overview; 
see Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross,1990, Brandts & Cooper, 2006;  Weber, Camerer & 
Knez, 2004; Keser, Ehrhart & Berninghaus,1998 for replications).21  
There is much more strategic uncertainty associated with high contributions in WL 
game than in the MM. In the WL game, a deviation downward by even a single “weak 
link” adjusts everyone’s payoff downward, and expenses associated “higher” choices are 
wasted. As mentioned above, the payoff for a “high” choice in the MM is quite robust to 
deviations downward by single players.  A similar comparison holds when the MM is 
compared with the step-level VCM mechanism.  
Pareto-ranked asymmetric equilibria in a step-level VCM. In step-level VCMs 
(henceforth, SL-VCM) (Isaac, Schmitz & Walker, 1984) the group account only yields a 
payoff if joint contributions reach a specified level. Any configuration with aggregate 
contributions at that level is an equilibrium.  Even though both are variations of the 
                                                 
21 Competition between groups with regard to the integer level chosen (Bornstein Gneezy & Nagel, 2002; 
Riechmann & Weimann (2004), or exclusion of the “weakest link” which effectively reduces risk (Fatas, 
Neugebauer & Perote, 2006) help facilitate coordination on a Pareto superior outcome. 
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standard VCM, there are significant structural differences between a SL-VCM and the 
MM. Most notably again, the efficient equilibrium in the SL-VCM is much less stable than 
in the MM. Similar to WL games, in the SL-VCM a slight deviation by one contributor so 
that the required threshold is not reached drives everyone’s incentives toward the 
equilibrium of non-contribution by all. 22 In fact, in the majority of instances, the SL-VCM 
is not very effective at maintaining high contributions.23 The MM in contrast, as the 
experimental test described below shows, is quite effective at maintaining efficiency over 
repeated rounds.  
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
Design and participants  
The MM was examined under MPCR=0.5 and MPCR = 0.3. Both MPCRs are 
commonly used in linear VCM experiments.  Under each MPCR condition, there were four 
experimental sessions with twelve participants each, a total of 96 subjects. Subjects were 
undergraduates from George Mason University were recruited from the general student 
population for an experiment with payoffs contingent upon the decisions they and other 
participants made during the session. Each session lasted for about two hours.  
Procedure 
Each participant received a $7 show-up fee, and was privately paid her 
experimental earnings at the end of the experiment. Participants were seated at computer 
terminals, visually separated from others by blinders. At the beginning of each round, each 
                                                 
22 Another difference is that in an asymmetric equilibrium in the SL-VCM, the payoffs from its different 
strategies can vary greatly.  In the MM by contrast, all expected, even though not necessarily final, payoffs 
are very similar across all strategies that are part of an asymmetric equilibrium. In that sense the MM 
resembles ME games where, in equilibrium, payoffs for different strategies are equal or close to equal. 
Related, in the SL-VCM subjects who apply the same strategy receive the same payoff. This is not the case in 
the MM because of the random solving of ties, which always occur in equilibrium. 
23 Its effectiveness depends somewhat on how high the threshold is. The higher the threshold, the riskier a 
contribution is. If the risk associated with wasted contributions is removed, contributions often rise even 
though there is also evidence to the contrary (see, e.g., Dawes et al., 1986).   
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subject received one hundred tokens to invest (in integer amounts) in either a private 
account, which returned one token for every token invested to that subject alone, or a group 
account, which returned tokens at the specified MPCR to everyone in his group including 
himself. For example, when the MPCR was 0.5, each token contributed to the group 
account returned 0.5 tokens to each person in the group. A new period began after all of the 
subjects indicated that they were ready. 24
Group assignment. In each round the twelve participants decided simultaneously 
how to divide their endowment between the group account and their respective individual 
accounts. After all subjects had made their contribution decisions they were separated in 
three groups of four: The four highest investors to the group account were put into one 
group, the fifth through the eighth highest investors into another group and the four lowest 
investors into a third group, with ties broken at random. After grouping, subjects’ earnings 
were calculated based on the group to which they had been assigned. Note that group 
assignment depended only on the subjects’ current contributions, not on contributions in 
previous rounds. Subjects were regrouped according to these criteria at each of the 80 
decision rounds. Appendix A contains the written instructions.  
End-of-round feedback.  After each round, an information screen showed a 
subject’s own private and public investment in that round, the total investment made by the 
group she belonged to, and her total earnings. The screen also contained an ordered series 
of the group account contributions by all participants, with a subject’s own contribution 
highlighted so that she could see her relative standing. This ordered series was visually 
split into three groups of four, which further underscored that participants had been 
grouped according to their contributions, and that any ties had been broken at random. .  
                                                 
24 The exchange rate between tokens and US Dollars was 1000:1.  In session 05-1 the exchange rate was 
880:1. Data from this session were not different from the data of the other MPCR=0.5 sessions. This session 
was therefore included in the data set and in the aggregate analyses.  
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V. RESULTS 
Result 1 
The MM substantially and reliably increases efficiency compared to a standard VCM.  
The solid lines in Figure 1 display mean contributions per MPCR and per round. 
Contributions are high and stable over all 80 rounds. Compare this to the regular VCM’s 
mean contributions, which start at about half of the endowment and decline toward the 
vicinity of zero within about ten rounds (Ledyard, 1995; Davis & Holt, 1993).  
Result 2  
Observed mean contributions correspond to mean contributions in the Pareto 
dominant equilibrium.  
The broken lines in Figure 1 represent the predicted mean contributions in the 
Pareto dominant equilibrium. Observed mean contributions per MPCR (solid lines) closely 
and steadily trace the predicted values.  Mean contributions over all 80 rounds are 70 
tokens for MPCR=0.3 (75 if the Pareto dominant equilibrium is adhered to without error) 
and 84 tokens under MPCR=0.5 (83.3 in the Pareto dominant equilibrium). 25 This patterns 
also emerges in the single sessions where the means are 65.2, 72.2, 71.8 and 72.3 for 
MPCR=0.3, and 86.1, 83.1, 81.3 and 84.9 for MPCR=0.5. The paths of single session over 
trials (Figure 2) resembles their aggregate pattern shown in Figure 1.  
Result 3 
Strategies that are part of the Pareto dominant equilibrium are predominantly 
selected.   
 The most efficient pure strategy equilibrium in the MM is extremely asymmetric 
since it consists of the two corner strategies from among a set of 101 strategies. Figure 3 
                                                 
25 Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests (see, e.g., Siegel & Castellan, 1988) with each session mean as one 
observation reject the null hypotheses that the mean contributions are the same across MPCRs (w=10, p < 
0.014) 
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displays the percentage in which available choices occurred over all trials, per MPCR.  In 
both MPCR conditions, subjects concentrated on the two strategies that are part of the 
payoff dominant equilibrium. Choices closely neighboring them are also somewhat more 
frequent. In light of the pattern displayed in Figure 3, in the analysis that follows choices 
≥98 are classified as full contributions, and choices ≤ 2 as noncontribution. 26 With this 
classification, 86 % of choices under MPCR 0.5, and 66% of choices under MPCR=0.3 fall 
under one of the two equilibrium strategies. 27 Result 5 below addresses this MPCR-related 
difference in percentages. There is no indication of attempts at any of the other less 
efficient equilibria involving low positive contributions (see Table 1, column 3).  
Result 4 
The proportions in which equilibrium strategies were selected are very close to  those 
of the payoff dominant equilibrium.  
In the payoff dominant equilibrium 10/12 of subjects (83.3%) make a full 
contribution under MPCR=0.5, and 9/12 under MPCR=0.3, while the remainder 
contributes nothing (see Table 1 A and B, rows 16 and 20). Figure 4 displays, by MPCR 
and per round, the observed percentage of zero contributions and full contributions, and 
their respective proportions in the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Within a few trials subjects 
reach close-to-equilibrium proportions. Figure 5 confirms this aggregate pattern for every 
single session even though the pattern is slightly less pronounced under MPCR-0.3, 
particularly in session 3-1.28   
                                                 
26 This is in accordance with both the prominence hypothesis (Selten, 1997) that people tend to make their 
choices in multiples of five, and the argument about neighboring strategies by Erev and Roth (1998). As can 
be inferred from Figure 3, this classification only minimally changes the analysis since choices closely 
neighboring the exact equilibrium strategies are relatively few.  
27 The respective exact counts are 83% and 56%. 
28 One-sample Kolmgorov-Smirnov tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) of the null hypothesis that the 
data come from a distribution exactly as specified in the most efficient equilibrium failed to rejected the null 
hypothesis at p=0.001 for sessions 05-1 and 05-2. Note that these are very stringent tests since behavior under 
a choice among 101 strategies is tested against a null hypothesis distribution that only allows for two 
strategies in specific proportions. 
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Result 5 
There are indications of behavioral MPCR effects.   
Figures 1- 5 show that aggregate contributions vary by MPCR as theoretically 
expected if  the most efficient equilibrium is realized in both MPCR conditions.  While 
behavior under both MPCR conditions is close to the respective Pareto dominant 
equilibrium, it appears somewhat closer under MPCR=0.5 than under MPCR=0.3. Under 
MPCR=0.5 the absolute frequencies of zero and full contributions over all 80 rounds are 
respectively 7 and 8 absolute percentage points lower than expected,  but for MPCR=0.3 
this difference is 9% and 26% (see also Figures 4 and 5). A one-tailed nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) with each session as 
an observation borderline rejects (p ≤ 0.056) the null hypothesis that the frequency of 
intermediate strategies, (that is, strategies that are not part of the equilibrium configuration) 
under MPCR=0.5 is equal to or larger than the frequency under MPCR=0.3, in favor of the 
alternate hypothesis (tentatively developed in Section II.B) that intermediate strategies are 
more frequent under MPCR=0.3. However, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 29 fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the shape of distributions of intermediate strategies differ by 
MPCR. Hence, their comparatively lower MPCR did not lead MPCR=0.3 subjects to 
systematically attempt any of the equilibria with lower positive contributions (listed in 
Table 1).30 Figure 3 confirms that if subjects intended to somehow hedge their bets under 
MPCR=0.3, their hedging strategies covered the entire strategy space.      
                                                 
29 For this test choices were bundled into multiples of five, based on the pattern displayed in Figure 3. For 
example, choices of 3, 4, 6 and 7 were recoded as “5”.  
30 In fact the mean of the intermediate contributions is higher under MPCR= 0.3 (59/100) than under 
MPCR=0.5 (48/100) but this difference is not significant (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test with the mean of 
intermediate strategies per session as one unit of observation, W=13, p ≤ 0.20). 
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Result 6  
Individual strategies are unsystematic.  
Individual choices over trials can be viewed at http://www.agsm.edu.au/~bobm/data.  In 
each of the MPCRs tested, there are actually ⎜⎜
⎛  payoff dominant equilibria, with various 
players taking one of the two roles, either contributing fully or not contributing. As Ochs 
(1999, p.143) states, once a profile of mutual best responses is realized, there is reason to 
expect that this stable pattern is repeated. However, while the payoff dominant equilibrium 
organizes aggregate behavior per round, individual choice paths over trials are diverse and 
hard to account for. Some subjects stick with one (mostly equilibrium) strategy, others 
alternate between the two equilibrium strategies or between equilibrium strategies and 
intermediate choices, in varying proportions. There is no evidence that individual strategies 
stabilize with experience. In this regard, the data resemble the well-documented pattern in 
Market Entry games where aggregate behavior is also well captured by the equilibrium 
while individual strategies are hard to account for. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎝ b
N
31
There is however one noteworthy regularity: In the standard VCM and some of its 
modifications in which subjects are sorted based on contributions but unbeknownst to 
them, stable contributor types have been identified. For example, some contribute as long 
as others do likewise, while so-called free-riders quite consistently contribute nothing (see, 
e.g., Gunnthorsdottir, Houser & McCabe, 2007; Ones & Putterman, 2006; Fischbacher, 
Gächter & Fehr, 2001; Keser & Van Winden, 2000; Kurzban & Houser, 2001; 2005). In 
the MM however, even though its asymmetric equilibria require behavioral heterogeneity 
including free-riding by a proportion of participants, there are hardly any stable free-riders.  
                                                 
31 31% of subjects in MPCR=0.5 made a full contribution in ≥ 70 of the 80 trials. In MPCR=0.3, 21% 
subjects did.  
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If those who contributed ≤ 2 in ≥ 50% of all trials are classified as non-contributors, there 
were only 6/96 such subjects, all in MPCR=0.3. 32   
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
We have shown that a Meritocracy that stratifies participants according to their 
contribution to the group good is an effective mechanism to overcome the free-rider 
problem. A simple adjustment to the excludability of the group good, making strata 
membership individually controllable rather than arbitrary, changes the equilibrium 
structure of a standard VCM and vastly improves efficiency. In society people do in fact 
contribute to joint output, broadly defined, and we have reviewed some contemporary and 
historical examples that can be accounted for by our model.  Since the nature of the team 
output covered by the model is broad, and equilibrium requirement for a close-to Pareto 
optimal solution not very strict (see Theorem Section II.A.) the Meritocracy Mechanism is 
applicable to a wide variety of settings.   
In our theoretical analysis we have extended a standard group-level analysis typical 
for the VCM into an analysis of a broadly defined social network in which members 
compete for inclusion in its various strata that vary in desirability.  We believe that we 
have, at the same time, given some indications to what could explain prior empirical results 
that show impressive efficiency gains in otherwise standard VCMs if group membership 
becomes competitively based on contributions.  
The experimental findings in the present study underscore the predictive and 
descriptive power of even quite complex Nash equilibria on the aggregate level, a 
phenomenon Kahneman (1988, p.12) termed “magical”. The Meritocracy Mechanism is 
particularly demanding on participants with regard to tacit coordination. There is a rich 
                                                 
32 They contributed ≤ 2 in 75, 65, 54, 43, 43 and 40 trials, respectively.   
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strategy set and multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, which are complex and counterintuitive. 
Somewhat surprisingly maybe, this is not a problem with regard to subject behavior. It is 
unlikely that participants in a Meritocracy Mechanism are able to grasp, or even roughly 
guess, its complex equilibria. Yet the most efficient equilibrium was reliably coordinated.33
Our results underscore the merits of meritocracies above and beyond the obvious:  In 
addition to its other well-recognized benefits, a meritocracy increases a social unit’s 
efficiency because it substantially reduces free-riding. There is less of an incentive to 
contribute if social stratification is by arbitrary privilege. If, however, an individual’s 
contribution, a variable that is under individual control determines her group membership, 
there is an obvious incentive to do one’s best. The empirical confirmation that the most 
efficient equilibrium is easily coordinated in an MM setting indicates that humans respond 
with ease to this kind of incentive structure, a fact also borne out by observing the diverse 
field settings in which the Mechanism has been implemented.  
Criticisms and extensions   
This paper has focused on the effectiveness of a new mechanism at the aggregate level. 
The workings of he MM on the individual level need to be examined in depth, such as 
individual decision strategies34 and, possibly, an MPCR-related impact of loss aversion.  
On the aggregate level, we recognize that while strata size is often fixed it isn’t always. 
Hence an extension where group size is endogenous and variable, and players are grouped 
based on whether their contributions are above or below certain thresholds would be 
appropriate.  
                                                 
33 Other somewhat structurally related games described in Section III are much simpler from a subject’s 
viewpoint; their strategy space is often more restricted (WL games and in particular, ME games with binary 
strategy space), and their pure strategy equilibria are much more intuitive (ME, WL, and SL-VCM games all 
fall into the latter category).   
34 Analysis of individual strategies should into account the fact that ties are broken at random, which means 
that payoffs for the same strategy can vary between trials.  
Comment [a87]: The MM’s most 
efficient equilibrium is therefore unlikely 
to be, for example, a focal point in the 
sense of Schelling (1960). 
Comment [a88]: For example the 
market entry game it is easy to 
understand that if enough players have 
entered there market, given the payoff 
functions of the two choices, there is a 
point at which one is indifferent between 
entering and staying out. in weakest link 
games, the structure again is obvious. In 
SL VCM games, too, 
Comment [A89]: HOwevr, a 
meritocracy, as a means of generating 
welfare (in this case in connection with 
the generation of collective output), may 
have an easy fit with human nature as 
does the market.  (Should we include this 
paragraph?) 
 
Comment [a90]: , such as their 
fairness, and the fact that they place 
players in positions where they are most 
suited. their impact on organizational or 
social effectiveness by positioning 
players in positions where they are most 
suited. 
Meritocracy 
29 
 
Yet another important question is the potential effect of unequal endowments on the 
MM system.  In the basic model introduced here this issue is bypassed since all participants 
have equal endowments, and a noteworthy feature of the MM asymmetric equilibria 
presented in this paper is that contributors and non-contributors receive approximately the 
same expected payoffs. The next step is to examine how sensitive the model is to 
inequities. Most communities provide some insurance and aid that raises the payoff of 
those less able to contribute, e.g., charities or unemployment benefits. Such equalizing 
practices could also be included into an MM model with unequal endowments, their extent 
varied, and the effects examined.   
Finally, we recognize that a pure meritocracy in its simplest form may not always 
be optimal for a social unit, and not only because large payoff differentials could reduce 
social cohesion but also because individual contributions can be multidimensional. For 
example, in organizational hiring, in addition to direct output, there is the question of 
employees’ cultural fit, and in some cases involving universities or nations, there is long-
term strategic value in diversity. However, such factors could also be included in a model 
of a member’s current and prospective contributions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of group decision-making.  You have already 
earned $7.00 for showing up at the appointed time. If you follow the instructions closely 
and make decisions carefully, you will make a substantial amount of money in addition to 
your show-up fee.  
 
There will be many decision-making periods. In each period, you are given an endowment 
of 100 tokens.  You need to decide how to divide these tokens between two accounts: a 
private account and a group account.  
 
Each token you place in the private account generates a cash return to you (and to you 
alone) of 1 cent.  
 
Tokens that group members invest in the group account will be added together to form the 
group investment. The group investment generates a cash return of 2 cents per token. These 
earnings are then divided equally between group members. Your group has 4 members 
(including yourself).  
 
Returns from the group investment are illustrated in the table below.  The left column lists 
various amounts of group investment; the right column contains the corresponding personal 
earnings for each group member.  
 
Returns from the Group Investment 
 
Total investment by Return to each group 
your group member  
 (From group investment) 
 
    0     0 
   20   10 
  40   20 
  60   30 
100   50 
150   75 
200 100 
300 150 
 400 200 
 
 
 
Example: 
Assume that, in a specific period, your endowment is 100 tokens. Assume further that you 
decide to contribute 50 tokens to your private account and 50 tokens to the group account. 
The other group members together contribute an additional 250 tokens to their group 
accounts. That makes the group investment 300 tokens, which generates 600 cents (300 * 2 
= 600). The 600 cents are then split equally among the 4 group members. Therefore, each 
group members earns 150 cents from the group investment (600/4=150). In addition to 
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earnings from the group account, each member gets 1 cent for every token invested in 
his/her private account. As you invested 50 tokens in the private account, your total profit 
in this period is 150 + 50 = 200 cents.  
 
Each period proceeds as follows: 
First, decide on the number of tokens to place in the private and in the group account, 
respectively.  Use the mouse to move your cursor to the box labeled “Private Account”. To 
make your private investment, click on the box and enter the number of tokens you wish to 
allocate to this account.  Do likewise for the box labeled “Group Account” Entries in the 
two boxes must sum to your endowment. To submit your investment click on the “Submit” 
button.  You will then wait until everyone else has submitted his or her investment 
decision. 
 
Second, once everyone has submitted his or her investment decision, you will be assigned 
to a group with 4 members (including yourself).  This assignment will proceed in the 
following manner: participants' contributions to the group account will first be ordered 
from the highest to the lowest. Then the four highest contributors will be grouped together. 
Participants whose contributions ranked from 5-8 will form another group. Finally, the four 
lowest contributors will form the third group. Any ties that may occur will be broken at 
random. Experimental earnings will be computed after you have been assigned to your 
group. Thus, your contribution to the group account in a specific round affects which group 
you are assigned to in that round. 
 
Third, you will receive a message with your experimental earnings for the period. This 
information will also appear in your Record Sheet at the bottom of the screen. The record 
sheet will also show the group account contributions by all participants in the experiment, 
including yours, in ascending order. Your contribution will be highlighted.  
 
A new period will begin after everyone has acknowledged his or her earnings message. 
 
After the last period, you will receive a message with your total experimental earnings 
(sum of earnings in each period). 
 
This is the end of the instructions. 
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Table 1A 
Equilibria for N=12, n=4, wi = 100, and MPCR=0.3. Discrete integer strategy space.  
 
 
  
Strategy configuration (s12, s11, …, s1) 
(Expected payoff per strategy in parentheses) 
 
 
Efficiency 35 
% 
1 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 
(100.00) 
0.0 
2 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 
(100.10) (100.02) 
0.4 
3 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(100.39) (100.78) 
0.8 
4 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 
(100.40)  (100.06) 
1.3 
5 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 
(100.30)  (100.10) 
0.7 
6 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(100.30)  (100.20)  (100.22) 
1.1 
7 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
                              (100.30)  (100.30)  (100.28) 
1.2 
8 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(100.60)  (100.20) 
1.5 
9 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 
(100. 60)   (100.40)   (100.44) 
2.3 
10 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 
(100.60)   (100.62)   100.40) 
2.7 
11 0, 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 
(100.90)  (100.30) 
2.3 
12 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 
(101.20)  (100.40) 
3.0 
13 0, 0, 0, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 
(101.50)  (100.50) 
3.8 
14 0, 0, 0, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6 
(101.80)  (100.60) 
4.5 
15 0, 0, 0, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7 
(102.10) (100.70) 
5.3 
16 (0, 0, 0, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100) 
(130.00)  (110.00) 
75.0 
 
                                                 
35 Contributions as a percentage of total endowments.  
Comment [a102]: would be better to 
Do it as a percentage of the maximum 
return. 
Comment [a103]: =5/1200 
 
Comment [a104]: {100.3}        
{99.3, 100.5}   {99.5, 100.4} 
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Table 1B 
Equilibria for N=12, n=4, wi = 100, and MPCR=0.5. Discrete integer strategy space.  
 
 
  
Strategy Configuration (s12, s11, …, s1) 
(Expected payoff per strategy in parentheses) 
 
 
Efficiency35 
% 
17 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
(100.00) 
0.0  
18 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 
(101.00)  (100.80) 
0.7 
19 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(102.00)  (101.60) 
1.5 
20 0, 0, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100 
(200.00)  (180.00) 
83.3 
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 Figure 1 
Observed mean group investment per round, compared to mean group investment in 
the Pareto dominant equilibrium, per MPCR.  
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Figure 2A 
   Equilibrium and mean contributions per round, per session, MPCR=0.3  
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Equilibrium and mean contributions per round, per session, MPCR=0.5 
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Relative frequency at which each strategy was chosen, by MPCR  
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Figure 4 
Observed proportion of zero and full contributions per round and proportions in 
the Pareto dominant equilibrium, by MPCR 
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Figure 5 A  
 Raw frequencies per session MPCR=0.3 
 
  
  
Full Contributions Zero Contributions 
0.3-1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71
0.3-2
21 31 41 51 61 71
0.3-1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 11
0.3-3
21 31 41 51 61 71
0.3-2
10
12
0
2
4
6
8
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 11
 
0.3-4
0.3-3
8
10
12
0
2
4
6
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71
 
0.3-4
4
6
8
10
12
0
2
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71
 
 
  
  
 
Meritocracy 
Figure 5 B 
Raw frequencies per session. MPCR=0.5 
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Page 18: [1] Comment [a32] annag 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
introduce exclusion from the group output, rather than the group itself, again limited to the least 
contributor. If all contribute equally, there is nobody to exclude, hence all symmetric contribution 
configurations are equilibria. This form of exclusion differs from the MM since there is no contribution-
based restratifcation (in fact, the authors use a partners treatment), but it is noteworthy that competition 
within a team for access to the group output, rather than competition across a mini-society as in the MM, 
also raises contributions to near-optimal levels. 
 
 
Page 18: [2] Comment [A34] AGSM 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
The Cinambuya study differs from ours in that, group membership and group size is endogenous and, 
unlike in the meritocracy game, group size is not fixed, which raises the question of the cost of ostracism to 
those who ostracize, an issue bypassed by the meritocracy game in which everyone is assigned to group (or, 
if you will, social layer).   
 
Page 18: [3] Comment [A37] AGSM 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
Public good; interact with person. Same for private goods. Trust. Our result is more 
compelling since it shows no need for that. Only thing u know is that people are sroted. 
Know mpcr. 2 pieces of info and find eqm. Istory indiates maybe future but History can 
lock u in ineff sit since past holds on to u even if your b. changes.  
 
 
Page 18: [4] Comment [A38] AGSM 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
exaples of endogenous rankings.problem with putterman is a 2-sided ranking. Prefs on both sides there is 
no equm. Markets whre there is prefs for each other u can proof that there is no equm. If both sides have 
prefs over the other e.g. marriage there is no equm. The issue with the putterman paper is that prefs are 
mutual. Friendship group based on how ethical. Putterman: people rank each other and give each other 
scores and then a central agent sorts. Paper that explores experimentally endogenous ranking of subjects 
but so far no equm worked out. Lots of empirical studies but no eqm worked out. There might be some 
math connection between puttermans eqm and theirs. History makes equa very complicated. We show u 
don’t need history for the thing to work. Yet we get efficiency. Why keep addl info about history? This is 
overhead. History is good because stability of past is indication of stability of future. 
 
Page 20: [5] Comment [a50] annag 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
a choice between entering a market and staying out, appear inconsistent with either mixed or pure 
Nash equilibria. Here we show that, in this class of game, learning theory predicts sorting, that 
is, in the long run, agents play a pure strategy equilibrium with some agents permanently in the 
market, and some permanently out. We conduct experiments with a larger number of repetitions 
than in previous work in order to test this prediction. We find that when subjects are given minimal 
information, only after close to 100 periods do subjects begin to approach equilibrium. In contrast, 
with full information, subjects learn to play a pure strategy equilibrium relatively quickly. However, 
the information which permits rapid convergence, revelation of the individual 
 
 
Page 20: [6] Comment [A52] AGSM 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
min effort. groups.’ 
The strategic uncertainty that underlies this incentive problem can profoundly 
affect behavior. Despite payoff-dominance, in VHBB’s largegroup 
minimum treatments A and A’ subjects initially chose widely dispersed 
efforts and then rapidly approached the lowest effort, ei = 1: 
 
 
Page 20: [7] Comment [a57] annag 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
Isaack smitz and wlkaer conclude: : havior we observed was a very small incidence of groups 
obtaining the more 
efficient equilibria and a large incidence of decay to the very low levels of contributions. 
For the groups that decayed, the pattern was similar to that observed 
in the free-riding (dominant strategy) environment. Thus, we estabhsh 
that the decay phenomenon is not caused solely by subjects learning a 
dominant strategy to free ride. This leads to a pessimistic conclusion that the 
voluntary contributions mechanism can significantly underprovide public 
goods in a much broader category than had been established by the dominant 
strategy experiments 
 
 
Page 25: [8] Comment [A75] AGSM 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
Our hypothesis is always at the population level. We assume that this comes due to 
competition. Similar example in siegel and castellan that is a pop of strikes. The question 
is does it correspond to the model? That it is interactive is part of the design. We know 
that in round 1 it does no happen, it needs to play in.  
It seems to me that ks tests are very robust holt laury on risk use them by accumulating 
all frequences of the risk qusitonaiiroe (so that each data point is a distribution) and 
comparing hi and lo stake (with the same subjects, so its essentially paired). Schotter 
(saved) takes from the first 20 rounds and the last 20 rounds of a 60 round expt. And 
compares the distributions. Again, they are not inde across rounds even though subjects 
play against the same opponent over rounds, so this is not a source of dependence.  
Kolmogorov-smirnov 1-sample test.  
 
 
Page 25: [9] Comment [A76] AGSM 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
The treatment effects are as e Conversely, , in 21 out of 80 rounds  the null hypothesis that the  
distribution of these frequencies 03 has a significantly lower  median was rejected in 
favor of the alternate  that the median of intermediate contriburions under 0.3 is in fact 
higher than under 0.5. (p 4,4 <0.5). . xpected: the effect of increasing the 
public good payoff from low-7 to high-7 is significant: subjects in high-7 
contribute more than subjects in low-7 (Mann-Whitney test with average 
values per session as observations, p = 0.0495) ; 
 
the larger the sample size this is what what will happen.  
 
 
Page 25: [10] Comment [a77] annag 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
mean frequencs  per mpcr are 57.5 vs 184.5.  the test however fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the frequences for positive contributions that are smaller than half the 
dneowment differ (p<=0.114, 2-tailed test). There frequencies are 110, 123, 83 and 52 for 
mpcr-0.3 and 49, 34, 69 and 68 for mpcr =05 with mean frequencies of 92 and 55, 
respectively.  
MWW test, again with the frequency of intermed stras per session as one observation, rejects the ho that 
there is no difference in the frequency of contributions larger 50 and smaller than the equilibrium. (p (2-
tailed)=0.029). the frequencies are 106, 96, 194 and 342 for mpcr=03, and 88, 70, 47 and 25 for mpcr=0. 
This difference in the frequency with which hi and low intermediate strategies are used in the two mpcrs 
can also be glaed from figure 2. The “reluctant subjects” contributed substantial amounts, but short of 
what was categorized as a full contribution (>=98). 
 
Page 25: [11] Comment [A79] AGSM 4/9/2007 2:44:00 PM 
pasted Also, from the standpoint of an individual loss-averse with regard to her current wealth levels 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), if the MPCR is low, the potential loss to a sole contributor compared to her 
prior endowment, (1-MPCR) increases as the MPCR decreases, making group contribution more “risky”.   In
sum, even though the MPCR, within certain constrains, has no bearing on the VCM’s equilibrium, it affects 
behavior. The MPCR does, however, affect the equilibrium in the meritocracy mechanism. 
 
 
